The Lalgarh operation against Maoist extremism in West Bengal exposed the weaknesses of our fight against non state actors. The ruling CPM coalition in West Bengal did not want to 'ban' the ultra Left Maoists, but expected the Union government to send paramilitary forces to fight them. But more disturbing is the growing nexus of corrupt politicians-bureaucrats and criminal gangs in diluting state action against trans-border crimes including gun running and human trafficking. This is abetting extremists gaining access to weapons. In addition to this, for a number of years Indian insurgents have been operating from hideouts and bases in India's neighbourhood - notoriously Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar - often with the connivance of the government of the country. Here is my article 'Spreding Out of Control' on the subject for your reading. It was published in GFiles magazine, July 2009 issue. Copyright: GFiles magazine
SPREADING OUT OF CONTROL
Local militancy going global in our neighbourhood has a deadly impact on national security
by COL R HARIHARAN GFiles, Vol 3 Issue 4 July 2009
TWO former chiefs of Bangladesh’s espionage agency – the National Security Intelligence (NSI) – Major General Rezakul Haider Chowdhury and Brigadier General Abdur Rahim, were recently arrested in Dhaka in the infamous arms smuggling case of Chittagong on April 2, 2004. They are being prosecuted for landing a shipload of Chinese arms in Chittagong destined for the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which is based in Bangladesh and waging an insurgency war in Assam.
It was not a small smuggling operation. According to the Bangladeshi media, police recovered from the 10- truckload consignment a wide range of sophisticated firearms, including 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 accessories of rocket launchers, 2000 grenade-launching tubes, 6392 magazines and 1,140,520 bullets. The Aga Rahman Yousuf Group, a Dubaibased business conglomerate, had sent the arms and ammunitions from China to Bangladesh for ULFA’s use.
This is one of many instances of local militancy and insurgencies going global in India’s neighbourhood with a deadly impact on India’s national security. Their symbiotic growth with a host of other criminal activities ranging from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and women and children to smuggling, forgery, and money laundering. They have also corrupted the law enforcing agencies and helped the growth of the political- criminal nexus. South Asia is geographically located between two of the biggest sources of the illegal drug trade in opium and heroin – Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east. Drug trafficking generates a number of other criminal activities, including money laundering, illegal arms trade, and human trafficking. The drug trade is a huge money spinner and it is not accidental that a number of insurgency movements have close links with the drug trade in Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Traditionally, the growth of militancy and other forms of extremist insurgency is attributed to socio-economic reasons, lack of proper governance and rule of law, religious fundamentalism, or aberrations of caste, creed, and linguistic differences. While these factors do provide a fertile ground for growth of militancy, the easy availability of illegal arms encourages escalation of political conflicts into extremism.
So South Asia has also become the heartland of the illegal trade in light weapons. Thanks to technological advances, they are no more light in their performance. The generally accepted 1977 UN definition of light weapons includes: MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems), ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons), heavy machine guns (including anti-aircraft guns), antimaterial rifles, recoilless rifles and guns, grenade launchers, unguided anti-tank rocket launchers, and mortars. The disturbing aspect is that all these weapons of modern armies have been in use among terrorist and militant groups operating in South Asia.
Formidable network of terror
EVEN without taking into account Afghanistan, which has been the focus of the US-led global war on terror since 2001, three South Asian countries – India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – have so far given birth to 249 anti-state entities that took up arms to achieve their goals, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data. Fortunately, only 91 of them, including 15 transnational ones, are functional today.
India has the largest number of terrorist and extremist organizations – 69 (including four transnational ones) still operating in its midst. Pakistan, the unrecognized homeland of Jihadi terrorism, has 22 extremist organizations (11 domestic and 11 transnational ones). It is in a gridlock with terrorists, fighting for its survival as a democratic nation.
Sri Lanka produced 37 insurgent bodies of various hues when the Tamil minority’s political quest for equal rights failed to produce results. However, recently the Sri Lanka military succeeded in crushing the only surviving Tamil insurgent group – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The only Sinhala insurgent group, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) turned into a Left-leaning political party two decades ago, after much bloodshed. And the country now hopes to have some respite from active insurgency.
Though Bangladesh has only five extremist organizations of the extreme leftist and Islamic fundamentalist varieties, they have continued to be a powerful destabilizing factor in the country’s politics. Nepal had been more fortunate. Its only insurgent body – the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) – managed to convert itself into a political party after the end of monarchy. It has not given up arms yet and that can spell potential trouble for Nepal’s nascent democracy.
Bhutan and the Maldives, having no major extremist entity in their midst, are the most fortunate.
The growth of terrorism in India has been encouraged by the availability of sanctuaries for terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. (India had also offered sanctuary to Sri Lanka Tamil extremists for nearly a decade in the 1990s). Unfortunately, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been using Indian insurgent groups in their midst to indirectly assert their power against India. In the case of Myanmar, the military regime had not been able to curb Indian insurgents operating from its soil due to their links with local insurgency groups.
Unless these countries deny sanctuary to Indian insurgent groups, India’s counterinsurgency operations will be only partially successful.
Given this setting, under the garb of protection, flaunting of weapons has become a status symbol in many of our states. As a corollary, indiscriminate issue of weapon licences has armed entire communities in many parts of India. The increasing social tolerance of the gun culture is symbolized by the replacement of the traditional soft image of Bollywood heroes with guntoting honchos sporting six packs.
It is not surprising that small arms are increasingly used to gain coercive power in public life. Poor governance and weaknesses in the criminal justice system have increased the clout of power brokers supported by armed gangs. Unfortunately, with criminals gaining more political influence, the gun culture has become a part of political life not only in India but other South Asian states as well. This has vitiated the effectiveness of existing gun control laws.
Between 1994 and 2008, about 60,000 people lost their lives in armed violence in India. Small arms were used to cause most of these deaths. These shocking figures give an idea of the price the nation is paying due to uncontrolled spread of illegal arms and the ever-increasing fire power of militancy.
So any grand strategy to curb insurgency and terrorism should address the larger social issues relating to the gun culture and easy access to illegal weapons. Existing laws on gun control need updating and enforcement needs to be tightened even for licensed guns. The growing nexus between politician bureaucrat- criminal gangs is the hothouse for insurgents to gain access to weapons. Unless this is broken through effective governance, lasting success in curbing terrorism and insurgency cannot be achieved.
Courtesy:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=13
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Wednesday, 8 July 2009
Friendly Neighbourhood Terrorism
Labels:
India,
Military Intelligence,
Myanmar,
South Asia,
Strategic Security,
Terrorism
Friday, 3 July 2009
Investigating Kargil - Indian Style
Vice Admiral Taj M Khattak(retired), former Vice Chief of Staff, Pakistan Navy has written an interesting and insightful article "Investigating Kargil" on General Musharraff's misadventure in Kargil that caused almost a nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India ten years ago. In that piece published in the www.thenews.com.pk on July 2, he has stressed the need for investigating the Kargil fiasco when the actors who directed and organised it are alive. So true.
In June 2004 I wrote an article "Learning from Kargil" (reproduced below) on the lack of follow up action on the K Subrahmanyam Committee report that investigated Kargil war. I had raised a few issues in the article which would impact on the nation's strategic security. In particular there are three issues K Subrahmanyam Committee had raised on which I still have strong doubts about any progress at all. Now that we have a government that has set about with a little more determination than the earlier one, will it enlighten the public on the progress? Will the under-worked parliament get to tackle such gut issues rather than waste time on frivolous 'walk-outs'? The three issues are:
1. Inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies.
2. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability.
3. It is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem.
LEARNING FROM KARGIL: A Soldier's View
By Col R. Hariharan(retd.) June 12, 2004
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1025.html
Never learn to do anything: if you don’t learn, you will always find someone else to do it for you. – Mark Twain
A new Lok Sabha was in session; but its old cacophony had not changed. Members have shouted their slogans, showed their loyalties to their icons by jumping and thumping, collected their entitlements and that’s it. Parliament’s inaugural session has ended. Has it achieved anything? The American English word “zilch” sums it up. But among the few foils that came in handy in the sad and sordid drama of Indian politics was Kargil and who goofed it up. The newspapers say the Kargil issue was brought up as a counter to the opposition’s vociferous objection to a few criminals accused of mundane crimes like rape, kidnapping and plotting to murder and elected as M.P.s becoming ministers. It is sad to see a possible security lapse in Kargil being equated with the issue of some smart, but criminally inclined fellows getting elected and ending up as ministers with full police protection!
Everyone, including the cynical but docile public, knows from past experience how this charade will be gone through. There will be a lot of finger pointing and talks of our jawans and Army being second to none; but nothing will come out of it. After all it is five years since K Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil presented its reports. Now, we find the Defence Minister is keen to follow up and ensure its findings are implemented. Five years is a long time for the troops serving in these troubled areas. They and their families (including me) would like to know how this issue did not figure all these years in the scheme of things of parties currently ruling the country (many of them were members of the outgoing government also!)
Its five years since hundreds like young Lt Saurabh Kalia died in the Kargil War. Many more are still dying in these frontiers unsung, unheard with only their families to mourn. As an old soldier who fought the wars in 1965, 1971 and lastly in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF, I wonder now whether the few thousands of my comrades who died for this country (and continue to do so, on and off) for notions of patriotism, loyalty and Izzat had done so in vain. The sheer callousness of our people in power shocks me.
Take for instance the case of 22 Border Security Force jawans and their families including women and children killed by militants in a mine blast in J and K. The State Chief Minister had no time to send even a condolence message. Was it because his party was busy probing for human rights violations in the fight against armed insurgents who are waging war on lawful government? Every time a jawan salutes him will he remember him for all the good he is going to do?
There is a tendency by bureaucrats, including those of the Armed Forces, to use the Official Secrets Act as a convenient cloak to cover all inefficiency, incompetence and deficiencies in the planning and handling of vital issues of national security and defence. I think the best memorial for those who died in Kargil would be not to allow another Kargil to happen. Even if it happens, the soldiers should go to war there confidently that they would not go like their predecessors did – taken by surprise, handled by ineptness, and lastly killed by sheer lack of timely decision making. It is time the Parliament debated the issues of defence seriously on matters more urgent than the number of orderlies Army officers use.. A whole list of issues is there in K Subrahmanyam Committee’s Report that needs to be followed up (and not to score political brownie points). These points need to be accounted for to the public at large as part of good governance. Here are some (findings of the Report given in italics):
* Inadequate border surveillance: Has the surveillance been beefed up in J and K, as the Committee found the intruders avoided detection because our Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO) by helicopters was of negligible effect? Israel was supposed to supply special surveillance helicopters for use in this sector. As in the new dispensation Israel appears to have become a bad word in South Block, has an alternate source been found? Or are still the files are being “processed”?
* The report states that there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. Has it improved now? If so, how.
* Holding of special (glacial) clothing for extreme cold climates was inadequate. Can we now say this problem has been overcome?
* Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm INSA) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered, as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. (This light rifle was introduced when I left the Army 13 years back. It’s a big joke that combat troops in high altitudes are still saddled with old rifles! I am not too optimistic things will change on this count). Can we hope for improvement?
* Nuclear weapons programme: For reasons of security, none of these Prime Ministers took anyone other than Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister into confidence. The Chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. Are the Service Chiefs still in the dark about their own nuclear capabilities? (I remember Johnson’s “Ignorance is bliss when it is folly to be wise” in this context). Is this major issue going to be brushed aside as “directly not pertaining to Kargil War”?
* Comprehensive manpower policy: Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J& K and the Northeast to involve the Indian Army in Counterinsurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counterstrategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war…. it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem. Has any thought been given to sort out the role of Army and evolution of a long-tem strategy for counter-insurgency? Or is it going to be deferred to the next government?
I saw a report saying that each parliament member costs the exchequer Rs 22 lacs. If they deliver the goods I don’t mind that expenditure at all. After all India is shining, (though the shine has been successfully tarnished a bit now) and why shouldn’t the parliament? But if the money is to become an investment, we would like them to be really people’s representatives. We want them to sit debate and improve the situation, lest the ghosts of those dead heroes of Kargil haunt us forever.
This is my learning from Kargil.
Read more!
In June 2004 I wrote an article "Learning from Kargil" (reproduced below) on the lack of follow up action on the K Subrahmanyam Committee report that investigated Kargil war. I had raised a few issues in the article which would impact on the nation's strategic security. In particular there are three issues K Subrahmanyam Committee had raised on which I still have strong doubts about any progress at all. Now that we have a government that has set about with a little more determination than the earlier one, will it enlighten the public on the progress? Will the under-worked parliament get to tackle such gut issues rather than waste time on frivolous 'walk-outs'? The three issues are:
1. Inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies.
2. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability.
3. It is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem.
LEARNING FROM KARGIL: A Soldier's View
By Col R. Hariharan(retd.) June 12, 2004
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1025.html
Never learn to do anything: if you don’t learn, you will always find someone else to do it for you. – Mark Twain
A new Lok Sabha was in session; but its old cacophony had not changed. Members have shouted their slogans, showed their loyalties to their icons by jumping and thumping, collected their entitlements and that’s it. Parliament’s inaugural session has ended. Has it achieved anything? The American English word “zilch” sums it up. But among the few foils that came in handy in the sad and sordid drama of Indian politics was Kargil and who goofed it up. The newspapers say the Kargil issue was brought up as a counter to the opposition’s vociferous objection to a few criminals accused of mundane crimes like rape, kidnapping and plotting to murder and elected as M.P.s becoming ministers. It is sad to see a possible security lapse in Kargil being equated with the issue of some smart, but criminally inclined fellows getting elected and ending up as ministers with full police protection!
Everyone, including the cynical but docile public, knows from past experience how this charade will be gone through. There will be a lot of finger pointing and talks of our jawans and Army being second to none; but nothing will come out of it. After all it is five years since K Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil presented its reports. Now, we find the Defence Minister is keen to follow up and ensure its findings are implemented. Five years is a long time for the troops serving in these troubled areas. They and their families (including me) would like to know how this issue did not figure all these years in the scheme of things of parties currently ruling the country (many of them were members of the outgoing government also!)
Its five years since hundreds like young Lt Saurabh Kalia died in the Kargil War. Many more are still dying in these frontiers unsung, unheard with only their families to mourn. As an old soldier who fought the wars in 1965, 1971 and lastly in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF, I wonder now whether the few thousands of my comrades who died for this country (and continue to do so, on and off) for notions of patriotism, loyalty and Izzat had done so in vain. The sheer callousness of our people in power shocks me.
Take for instance the case of 22 Border Security Force jawans and their families including women and children killed by militants in a mine blast in J and K. The State Chief Minister had no time to send even a condolence message. Was it because his party was busy probing for human rights violations in the fight against armed insurgents who are waging war on lawful government? Every time a jawan salutes him will he remember him for all the good he is going to do?
There is a tendency by bureaucrats, including those of the Armed Forces, to use the Official Secrets Act as a convenient cloak to cover all inefficiency, incompetence and deficiencies in the planning and handling of vital issues of national security and defence. I think the best memorial for those who died in Kargil would be not to allow another Kargil to happen. Even if it happens, the soldiers should go to war there confidently that they would not go like their predecessors did – taken by surprise, handled by ineptness, and lastly killed by sheer lack of timely decision making. It is time the Parliament debated the issues of defence seriously on matters more urgent than the number of orderlies Army officers use.. A whole list of issues is there in K Subrahmanyam Committee’s Report that needs to be followed up (and not to score political brownie points). These points need to be accounted for to the public at large as part of good governance. Here are some (findings of the Report given in italics):
* Inadequate border surveillance: Has the surveillance been beefed up in J and K, as the Committee found the intruders avoided detection because our Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO) by helicopters was of negligible effect? Israel was supposed to supply special surveillance helicopters for use in this sector. As in the new dispensation Israel appears to have become a bad word in South Block, has an alternate source been found? Or are still the files are being “processed”?
* The report states that there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. Has it improved now? If so, how.
* Holding of special (glacial) clothing for extreme cold climates was inadequate. Can we now say this problem has been overcome?
* Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm INSA) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered, as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. (This light rifle was introduced when I left the Army 13 years back. It’s a big joke that combat troops in high altitudes are still saddled with old rifles! I am not too optimistic things will change on this count). Can we hope for improvement?
* Nuclear weapons programme: For reasons of security, none of these Prime Ministers took anyone other than Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister into confidence. The Chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. Are the Service Chiefs still in the dark about their own nuclear capabilities? (I remember Johnson’s “Ignorance is bliss when it is folly to be wise” in this context). Is this major issue going to be brushed aside as “directly not pertaining to Kargil War”?
* Comprehensive manpower policy: Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J& K and the Northeast to involve the Indian Army in Counterinsurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counterstrategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war…. it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem. Has any thought been given to sort out the role of Army and evolution of a long-tem strategy for counter-insurgency? Or is it going to be deferred to the next government?
I saw a report saying that each parliament member costs the exchequer Rs 22 lacs. If they deliver the goods I don’t mind that expenditure at all. After all India is shining, (though the shine has been successfully tarnished a bit now) and why shouldn’t the parliament? But if the money is to become an investment, we would like them to be really people’s representatives. We want them to sit debate and improve the situation, lest the ghosts of those dead heroes of Kargil haunt us forever.
This is my learning from Kargil.
Read more!
Labels:
Armed Forces,
India,
Intelligence,
Pakistan,
Strategic Security,
Terrorism
Thursday, 2 July 2009
Kargil War and Murphy's Combat Laws
It will be ten years since Kargil War took place. It was a war that should have never happened and raised a lot of questions on our approach to war as a nation. Have things improved? It is difficult to say unless another Kargil tests the nation and all of us. In this context Murphy's Combat Laws comes to mind because Kargil validated it. I am reproducing this collection from unknown authors here for your reading; its reproduced not only for humour but underlying truth. Ask any guy who had participated in a war not only in India, but Pakistan, Aghanistan, Iraq or anywhere he will agree with me.
Murphy's Combat Laws
Friendly fire - isn't.
Recoilless rifles - aren't.
Suppressive fires - won't.
A sucking chest wound is Nature's way of telling you to slow down.
If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid.
Try to look unimportant; the enemy may be low on ammo and not want to waste a bullet on you.
If at first you don't succeed, call in an air strike.
If you are forward of your position, your artillery will fall short.
Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
Never go to bed with anyone crazier than yourself.
Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
If your attack is going really well, it's an ambush.
The enemy diversion you're ignoring is their main attack.
The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions: when they're ready. & when you're not.
No Op Plan ever survives initial contact.
There is no such thing as a perfect plan.
Five second fuses always burn three seconds.
There is no such thing as an atheist in a foxhole.
A retreating enemy is probably just falling back and regrouping.
The important things are always simple; the simple are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.
Teamwork is essential; it gives the enemy other people to shoot at.
Don't look conspicuous; it draws fire. For this reason, it is not at all uncommon for aircraft carriers to be known as bomb magnets.
Never draw fire; it irritates everyone around you.
If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in the combat zone.
When you have secured the area, make sure the enemy knows it too.
Incoming fire has the right of way.
No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
No inspection ready unit has ever passed combat.
If the enemy is within range, so are you.
The only thing more accurate than incoming enemy fire is incoming friendly fire.
Things which must be shipped together as a set, aren't.
Things that must work together; can't be carried to the field that way.
Radios will fail as soon as you need fire support.
Radar tends to fail at night and in bad weather, and especially during both.
Anything you do can get you killed, including nothing.
Make it too tough for the enemy to get in, and you won't be able to get out.
Tracers work both ways.
If you take more than your fair share of objectives, you will get more than your fair share of objectives to take.
When both sides are convinced they're about to lose, they're both right.
Professional soldiers are predictable; the world is full of dangerous amateurs.
Military Intelligence is a contradiction.
Fortify your front; you'll get your rear shot up.
Weather isn’t neutral.
If you can't remember, the Claymore is pointed towards you.
Air defence motto: shoot them down; sort them out on the ground.
Flies high, it dies; low and slow, it'll go.
Mines are equal opportunity weapons
Sniper's motto: reach out and touch someone.
The one item you need is always in short supply.
Interchangeable parts aren't.
It's not the one with your name on it; it's the one addressed "to whom it may concern" you've got to think about.
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
The side with the simplest uniforms wins.
Combat will occur on the ground between two adjoining maps.
If you can keep your head while those around you are losing theirs, you may have misjudged the situation.
If two things are required to make something work, they will never be shipped together.
Anything you do can get you shot, including nothing.
Whenever you lose contact with the enemy, look behind you.
The most dangerous thing in the combat zone is an officer with a map.
The quartermaster has only two sizes, too large and too small.
If you really need an officer in a hurry, take a nap.
There is nothing more satisfying than having someone take a shot at you, and miss.
If your sergeant can see you, so can the enemy.
You'll only remember your hand grenades when the sound is too close to use them.
Close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.
Well .. It could be worse: It could be raining .. and we could be out in it.
So he said, "Cheer up: it could be worse!" So we cheered up. And it got worse.
The side with the simplest uniform wins...
The spare batteries for the PRC-whatever your troops have been carrying are either nearly dead or for the wrong radio.
How come you are on one frequency when everyone else is on another?
Read more!
Murphy's Combat Laws
Friendly fire - isn't.
Recoilless rifles - aren't.
Suppressive fires - won't.
A sucking chest wound is Nature's way of telling you to slow down.
If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid.
Try to look unimportant; the enemy may be low on ammo and not want to waste a bullet on you.
If at first you don't succeed, call in an air strike.
If you are forward of your position, your artillery will fall short.
Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
Never go to bed with anyone crazier than yourself.
Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
If your attack is going really well, it's an ambush.
The enemy diversion you're ignoring is their main attack.
The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions: when they're ready. & when you're not.
No Op Plan ever survives initial contact.
There is no such thing as a perfect plan.
Five second fuses always burn three seconds.
There is no such thing as an atheist in a foxhole.
A retreating enemy is probably just falling back and regrouping.
The important things are always simple; the simple are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.
Teamwork is essential; it gives the enemy other people to shoot at.
Don't look conspicuous; it draws fire. For this reason, it is not at all uncommon for aircraft carriers to be known as bomb magnets.
Never draw fire; it irritates everyone around you.
If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in the combat zone.
When you have secured the area, make sure the enemy knows it too.
Incoming fire has the right of way.
No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
No inspection ready unit has ever passed combat.
If the enemy is within range, so are you.
The only thing more accurate than incoming enemy fire is incoming friendly fire.
Things which must be shipped together as a set, aren't.
Things that must work together; can't be carried to the field that way.
Radios will fail as soon as you need fire support.
Radar tends to fail at night and in bad weather, and especially during both.
Anything you do can get you killed, including nothing.
Make it too tough for the enemy to get in, and you won't be able to get out.
Tracers work both ways.
If you take more than your fair share of objectives, you will get more than your fair share of objectives to take.
When both sides are convinced they're about to lose, they're both right.
Professional soldiers are predictable; the world is full of dangerous amateurs.
Military Intelligence is a contradiction.
Fortify your front; you'll get your rear shot up.
Weather isn’t neutral.
If you can't remember, the Claymore is pointed towards you.
Air defence motto: shoot them down; sort them out on the ground.
Flies high, it dies; low and slow, it'll go.
Mines are equal opportunity weapons
Sniper's motto: reach out and touch someone.
The one item you need is always in short supply.
Interchangeable parts aren't.
It's not the one with your name on it; it's the one addressed "to whom it may concern" you've got to think about.
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
The side with the simplest uniforms wins.
Combat will occur on the ground between two adjoining maps.
If you can keep your head while those around you are losing theirs, you may have misjudged the situation.
If two things are required to make something work, they will never be shipped together.
Anything you do can get you shot, including nothing.
Whenever you lose contact with the enemy, look behind you.
The most dangerous thing in the combat zone is an officer with a map.
The quartermaster has only two sizes, too large and too small.
If you really need an officer in a hurry, take a nap.
There is nothing more satisfying than having someone take a shot at you, and miss.
If your sergeant can see you, so can the enemy.
You'll only remember your hand grenades when the sound is too close to use them.
Close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.
Well .. It could be worse: It could be raining .. and we could be out in it.
So he said, "Cheer up: it could be worse!" So we cheered up. And it got worse.
The side with the simplest uniform wins...
The spare batteries for the PRC-whatever your troops have been carrying are either nearly dead or for the wrong radio.
How come you are on one frequency when everyone else is on another?
Read more!
Monday, 22 June 2009
The Great Game in Sri Lanka
My article on the emerging strategic scene in Sri Lanka published in the [COVERT] magazine Volume 2 Issue 3 for 18 June - 30 June 2009 is reproduced here for your reading kind courtesy COVERT.
LEST WE LOSE THE GREAT GAME IN LANKA
Chennai: Sri Lanka’s security forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, eliminating its leader and guiding spirit Velupillai Prabhakaran and almost the entire leadership. Their success comes after a failure to achieve decisive results in three earlier episodes of war, spread over more than two decades.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s result-oriented national leadership was the single major factor that helped Sri Lanka eliminate the LTTE as a power centre threatening national integrity. His Government’s shortcomings on human rights and rule of law appear to have been forgotten in the afterglow of victory. Riding the crest of unprecedented popularity, Rajapaksa is emerging as an unchallenged monolithic power centre in his country.
War and its aftermath have changed the strategic environment in Sri Lanka. The military has emerged as a modern, professionally competent, battle-tested fighting force. The army is poised to grow into a force of 300,000, roughly one fourth the size of the Indian Army and bigger than the armies of Europe — Germany, Italy and France. Oversized armed forces in small countries usually become an additional power centre, and Sri Lanka might prove to be no exception.
A significant feature of the war was the minimal Indian influence exerted on Sri Lanka, in sharp contrast to India’s high profile involvement in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Tamil confrontation from the time of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She had woven the Tamil problem into the overall matrix of India’s strategic security construct on Sri Lanka in the 1980s at the height of the Cold War. But in keeping with its new equations with Sri Lanka, India not only did not interfere in the operations against the LTTE, but also did not contribute much to the peace process that preceded it.
India’s vanilla influence on Sri Lanka started waning after Rajiv Gandhi failed in his well-intentioned, but ill-conceived, military intervention to enforce the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. India was particularly bitter after it had to ignominiously recall its troops when the LTTE and Sri Lanka colluded to throw the Indians out. LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi later dissipated the goodwill and sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils that existed in 1987.
DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES, India’s strategic priorities have changed in the Indian Ocean Region, in keeping with the strategic changes taking place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. India and the United States are building a strategic relationship in the region. China is increasing its presence in all countries in India’s neighbourhood. Terrorism has become a universal problem.
India’s agenda for Sri Lanka has mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages. In spite of this, New Delhi was reluctant to participate in the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. In fact, India declined to accept President Rajapaksa’s invitation to join the peace process earlier. China stepped in to supply the bulk of armaments Sri Lanka required for its operations against the LTTE. It also made financial aid available. Sri Lanka found the Chinese weapons to be attractively priced and readily available, particularly as India could not help because of stiff opposition from political parties in Tamil Nadu. This enabled China to strengthen its strategic linkages with Sri Lanka. Pakistan also contributed with a supply of weapons, though on a more modest scale than China. As a result, China has gained considerable strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka, filling the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to participate actively in Sri Lanka’s war effort. The Chinese are also constructing a commercial port complex in Hambantota in the south, and when completed this will make China’s presence in Sri Lanka more assertive.
The US too has been playing an active role in Sri Lanka, participating in the peace process of 2002 and later supporting its war effort. At the same time, the US has been in close touch with India on issues relating to Sri Lanka. This tacit cooperation had continued all through the operations against the LTTE, even on key issues where the two countries had differing views. This consultative relationship is likely to continue because India has a unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka unmatched by any other power.
However, US presence is probably also linked to its larger global security concerns over the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. So it would be strategically prudent for the US to keep a toehold in Sri Lanka, where China is enlarging its influence. The US is also probably wary of Iran’s moves to cultivate Sri Lanka with the extension of a billion dollars in aid.
The recent US actions in Af-Pak region have not increased India’s confidence in the US. There are indications of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement losing its momentum. Thus, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits New Delhi these two issues are likely to dominate the agenda. Sri Lanka might figure only as appreciation of India’s positive influence on the island.
Sri Lanka is slowly being drawn into a global power play and India will feel its impact. India has to evolve a new strategic paradigm to handle it. A peaceful, stable and prosperous Sri Lanka is a strategic asset for India. So fundamentally, India will have to help Sri Lanka get out of the 30-year-old ravages of war to become peaceful and stable.
THE GOVERNMENT will have to focus on its critical strengths conferred by Sri Lanka’s geographic proximity, cultural similarity, religious identity and economic linkages to make India more relevant to the island nation than other distant nations. Already, India-Sri Lanka trade is burgeoning thanks to the Free Trade Agreement in place. But to add to bilateral strategic strength there has to be greater India-Sri Lanka convergence in defence and security perceptions. Both countries have a long history of military cooperation. Sri Lanka, like other smaller neighbours, has a latent fear of India’s overwhelming influence. This has to be addressed to create greater confidence, which will lead to better strategic understanding. India should formalise the defence treaty, which is held in suspended animation.
India will have to help Sri Lanka’s healing process. Sri Lankans should be enabled to travel to India freely. Indian investments can create job opportunities in the troubled north and wean away the youth from possible militancy. Technical-education institutions are a plenty in the South and should be thrown open to Sri Lankan students. War-torn Sri Lanka needs a massive reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. India can help on this front immediately. Contentious issues that had been dogging relations between the two countries will take longer to resolve. All that is required is political will and tenacity of purpose.
Courtesy: http://www.covertmagazine.com/essay.htm
Read more!
LEST WE LOSE THE GREAT GAME IN LANKA
Chennai: Sri Lanka’s security forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, eliminating its leader and guiding spirit Velupillai Prabhakaran and almost the entire leadership. Their success comes after a failure to achieve decisive results in three earlier episodes of war, spread over more than two decades.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s result-oriented national leadership was the single major factor that helped Sri Lanka eliminate the LTTE as a power centre threatening national integrity. His Government’s shortcomings on human rights and rule of law appear to have been forgotten in the afterglow of victory. Riding the crest of unprecedented popularity, Rajapaksa is emerging as an unchallenged monolithic power centre in his country.
War and its aftermath have changed the strategic environment in Sri Lanka. The military has emerged as a modern, professionally competent, battle-tested fighting force. The army is poised to grow into a force of 300,000, roughly one fourth the size of the Indian Army and bigger than the armies of Europe — Germany, Italy and France. Oversized armed forces in small countries usually become an additional power centre, and Sri Lanka might prove to be no exception.
A significant feature of the war was the minimal Indian influence exerted on Sri Lanka, in sharp contrast to India’s high profile involvement in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Tamil confrontation from the time of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She had woven the Tamil problem into the overall matrix of India’s strategic security construct on Sri Lanka in the 1980s at the height of the Cold War. But in keeping with its new equations with Sri Lanka, India not only did not interfere in the operations against the LTTE, but also did not contribute much to the peace process that preceded it.
India’s vanilla influence on Sri Lanka started waning after Rajiv Gandhi failed in his well-intentioned, but ill-conceived, military intervention to enforce the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. India was particularly bitter after it had to ignominiously recall its troops when the LTTE and Sri Lanka colluded to throw the Indians out. LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi later dissipated the goodwill and sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils that existed in 1987.
DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES, India’s strategic priorities have changed in the Indian Ocean Region, in keeping with the strategic changes taking place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. India and the United States are building a strategic relationship in the region. China is increasing its presence in all countries in India’s neighbourhood. Terrorism has become a universal problem.
India’s agenda for Sri Lanka has mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages. In spite of this, New Delhi was reluctant to participate in the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. In fact, India declined to accept President Rajapaksa’s invitation to join the peace process earlier. China stepped in to supply the bulk of armaments Sri Lanka required for its operations against the LTTE. It also made financial aid available. Sri Lanka found the Chinese weapons to be attractively priced and readily available, particularly as India could not help because of stiff opposition from political parties in Tamil Nadu. This enabled China to strengthen its strategic linkages with Sri Lanka. Pakistan also contributed with a supply of weapons, though on a more modest scale than China. As a result, China has gained considerable strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka, filling the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to participate actively in Sri Lanka’s war effort. The Chinese are also constructing a commercial port complex in Hambantota in the south, and when completed this will make China’s presence in Sri Lanka more assertive.
The US too has been playing an active role in Sri Lanka, participating in the peace process of 2002 and later supporting its war effort. At the same time, the US has been in close touch with India on issues relating to Sri Lanka. This tacit cooperation had continued all through the operations against the LTTE, even on key issues where the two countries had differing views. This consultative relationship is likely to continue because India has a unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka unmatched by any other power.
However, US presence is probably also linked to its larger global security concerns over the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. So it would be strategically prudent for the US to keep a toehold in Sri Lanka, where China is enlarging its influence. The US is also probably wary of Iran’s moves to cultivate Sri Lanka with the extension of a billion dollars in aid.
The recent US actions in Af-Pak region have not increased India’s confidence in the US. There are indications of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement losing its momentum. Thus, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits New Delhi these two issues are likely to dominate the agenda. Sri Lanka might figure only as appreciation of India’s positive influence on the island.
Sri Lanka is slowly being drawn into a global power play and India will feel its impact. India has to evolve a new strategic paradigm to handle it. A peaceful, stable and prosperous Sri Lanka is a strategic asset for India. So fundamentally, India will have to help Sri Lanka get out of the 30-year-old ravages of war to become peaceful and stable.
THE GOVERNMENT will have to focus on its critical strengths conferred by Sri Lanka’s geographic proximity, cultural similarity, religious identity and economic linkages to make India more relevant to the island nation than other distant nations. Already, India-Sri Lanka trade is burgeoning thanks to the Free Trade Agreement in place. But to add to bilateral strategic strength there has to be greater India-Sri Lanka convergence in defence and security perceptions. Both countries have a long history of military cooperation. Sri Lanka, like other smaller neighbours, has a latent fear of India’s overwhelming influence. This has to be addressed to create greater confidence, which will lead to better strategic understanding. India should formalise the defence treaty, which is held in suspended animation.
India will have to help Sri Lanka’s healing process. Sri Lankans should be enabled to travel to India freely. Indian investments can create job opportunities in the troubled north and wean away the youth from possible militancy. Technical-education institutions are a plenty in the South and should be thrown open to Sri Lankan students. War-torn Sri Lanka needs a massive reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. India can help on this front immediately. Contentious issues that had been dogging relations between the two countries will take longer to resolve. All that is required is political will and tenacity of purpose.
Courtesy: http://www.covertmagazine.com/essay.htm
Read more!
Labels:
China,
India,
South Asia,
Sri Lanka,
Strategic Security,
Terrorism,
USA
Sunday, 21 June 2009
Politicization of Indian armed forces
I am reproducing a provocative article by former Indian Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash on the issue of growing disenchantment of servicemen in India with the way issues relating to the Services are dealt with. I hope the defence minister takes note of this trend, and takes it up with the Prime Minister for corrective action. It will be a sad day the SERVICES, the only totally integrated arm of the nation turns into a cynical body with leaders making deals with backroom boys. Your comments are welcome.
WHILE WE SLEPT: POLITICIZATION OF INDIA’S ARMED FORCES
Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)
The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian Armed Forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed Forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India’s integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation.
Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership.
This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Bose’s Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the Service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship. Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority.
Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or Service.
Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations in April 2008, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?.
Although they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the Services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development.
I am not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Raksha Mantri, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a Service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the Services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM.
At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a Service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications. A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman COSC took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.
Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the Government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were.
The current ESM movement has been able to mobilize opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming General Elections.
Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of “politicization” of our Armed Forces is well under way, if not complete. The 6th CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.
As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain “an umbilical connection” with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same extended family, whom they meet when on leave. In any case, the Services and ESM constitute one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of “reverse osmosis” to the men in uniform.
Even if the politicians and bureaucrats do not care, the nation’s intelligentsia (where are they?) need to introspect. Does the nation want proud, independent and self-respecting Armed Forces who live by the professional soldiers’ honour code and die unquestioningly for their country; or do we want their soldiers tainted with the stain of “politics”. Were this to happen – even by default – it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state.
India’s democracy requires that the Armed Forces must be restored to their original pristine state at the earliest; detached from politics, and focused on the profession of arms. The first step is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission (what is termed a Blue Ribbon Commission in the UK), and NOT another committee of bureaucrats, to examine and address the full gamut of issues.
Read more!
WHILE WE SLEPT: POLITICIZATION OF INDIA’S ARMED FORCES
Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)
The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian Armed Forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed Forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India’s integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation.
Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership.
This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Bose’s Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the Service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship. Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority.
Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or Service.
Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations in April 2008, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?.
Although they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the Services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development.
I am not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Raksha Mantri, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a Service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the Services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM.
At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a Service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications. A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman COSC took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.
Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the Government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were.
The current ESM movement has been able to mobilize opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming General Elections.
Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of “politicization” of our Armed Forces is well under way, if not complete. The 6th CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.
As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain “an umbilical connection” with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same extended family, whom they meet when on leave. In any case, the Services and ESM constitute one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of “reverse osmosis” to the men in uniform.
Even if the politicians and bureaucrats do not care, the nation’s intelligentsia (where are they?) need to introspect. Does the nation want proud, independent and self-respecting Armed Forces who live by the professional soldiers’ honour code and die unquestioningly for their country; or do we want their soldiers tainted with the stain of “politics”. Were this to happen – even by default – it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state.
India’s democracy requires that the Armed Forces must be restored to their original pristine state at the earliest; detached from politics, and focused on the profession of arms. The first step is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission (what is termed a Blue Ribbon Commission in the UK), and NOT another committee of bureaucrats, to examine and address the full gamut of issues.
Read more!
Labels:
Armed Forces,
India,
South Asia,
Strategic Security
Saturday, 20 June 2009
Soft underbelly of India’s internal security
There are a series of disturbing bits of news flowing in just one week’s media reports that expose the soft underbelly of India’s internal security (own comments are given in italics):
• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).
• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.
• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.
• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.
Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.
It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!
So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.
Read more!
• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).
• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.
• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.
• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.
Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.
It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!
So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.
Read more!
Labels:
India,
Military Intelligence,
Pakistan,
South Asia,
Terrorism
Armed Forces Tribunal to start functioning from July
According to media reports the much-awaited Armed Forces Tribunal(AFT)is expected to
start functioning from July 2009. The report said the appointment of 15 retired senior officers of armed forces as administrative members is over. And the appointment of judicial members, to be selected from retired high court judges, is underway.
The enactment for the creation of the AFT was passed in parliament on December 7, 2007. Former Supreme Court judge, Justice AK Mathur, will be heading the tribunal.The AFT's principal Bench would be based at New Delhi
The AFT will deal with about 12,000 cases related to armed forces pending in various courts now relating to courts martial proceedings, and matters such as promotions, postings, pay and allowances, etc.,after they are transferred to it. This measure it is hoped will ensure speedier disposal of cases.
In addition will be eight regional Benches, Chandigarh, Chennai,Guwahati, Jaipur, Kochi, Kolkata, Lucknow and Mumbai. Each Bench will have judicial and well as administrative members.
The media reported the names of the administrative members the Chandigarh Bench as:Lt Gen HS Panag, former GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Lt Gen AS Bahia, former Quarter Master General and Lt Gen NS Brar, former GOC 10 Corps. This bench will deal with cases from the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.
Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman, Lt Gen ML Naidu, both former Vice-Chief of the Anny Staff, Lt Gen Thomas Mathew, former Adjutant General, Lt Gen RK Chhabra, former Chief of Staff, Southern Command and Rear Admiral R Contractor are some of the other names of administrative memebrs.
All administrative members will have the status of a judge of the high court with corresponding salary and service conditions.
Read more!
start functioning from July 2009. The report said the appointment of 15 retired senior officers of armed forces as administrative members is over. And the appointment of judicial members, to be selected from retired high court judges, is underway.
The enactment for the creation of the AFT was passed in parliament on December 7, 2007. Former Supreme Court judge, Justice AK Mathur, will be heading the tribunal.The AFT's principal Bench would be based at New Delhi
The AFT will deal with about 12,000 cases related to armed forces pending in various courts now relating to courts martial proceedings, and matters such as promotions, postings, pay and allowances, etc.,after they are transferred to it. This measure it is hoped will ensure speedier disposal of cases.
In addition will be eight regional Benches, Chandigarh, Chennai,Guwahati, Jaipur, Kochi, Kolkata, Lucknow and Mumbai. Each Bench will have judicial and well as administrative members.
The media reported the names of the administrative members the Chandigarh Bench as:Lt Gen HS Panag, former GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Lt Gen AS Bahia, former Quarter Master General and Lt Gen NS Brar, former GOC 10 Corps. This bench will deal with cases from the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.
Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman, Lt Gen ML Naidu, both former Vice-Chief of the Anny Staff, Lt Gen Thomas Mathew, former Adjutant General, Lt Gen RK Chhabra, former Chief of Staff, Southern Command and Rear Admiral R Contractor are some of the other names of administrative memebrs.
All administrative members will have the status of a judge of the high court with corresponding salary and service conditions.
Read more!
Labels:
Armed Forces,
India,
South Asia,
Strategic Security
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